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ABSTRACT
To this day, participation rights in Sweden have been reserved for union members both on the 
company level and on the board level, while all employees in companies, which are covered by 
respective agreements and laws, have voting rights in Norway.  The aim of this article is twofold: 
First of all, it traces this difference back in time, using historical evidence from relevant periods of 
the 20th century to illuminate how approaches of Swedish and Norwegian unions to representative 
worker participation evolved.  Through the method of comparison, not only similarities and differ-
ences between the two countries but also continuities within the two union movements become 
apparent. It becomes clear that unions of both countries were worried about “double loyalties”, 
but participation was more closely and deliberately linked with membership in Sweden.  This in 
turn points to the second aim of the article, namely to identify possible reasons for this particular 
difference. Why were Swedish unions apparently more worried about “free riders”? While a final 
explanation will not be attempted here, one possible explaining factor is that private capital 
concentration was higher in Sweden and that Swedish employer organizations were more power-
ful. Swedish unions thus might have used membership requirements with regard to participation 
to avoid internal splits and to protect their comparatively high unity and density.  This might have 
helped them to confront their, in comparison with Norway, better organized adversaries.  The main 
aim of the article, however, is the first one, namely to give a synthetical, comparative account  
of Swedish and Norwegian unions’ approaches to representative worker participation during the 
20th century, with a main focus on voting rights.
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Introduction
Labor unions played a crucial role throughout the 20
th century in all Scandinavian 
countries. They organized such large parts of the population that their impact on 
society, economy, and politics was immense, especially compared with other Eu-
ropean countries (cf. Heiret et al., 2003; Korpi, 1978; Streeck & Hassel, 2003). Even 
though union density has somewhat declined in recent decades, it is safe to assume that 
the study of labor unions still is key to understanding Nordic societies (Nergaard, 2010). 
However, recent developments in Nordic industrial relations should be analyzed with 
history in mind. How did labor unions in the Nordic countries manage to achieve what 
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they did? How did they deal with organizational challenges and contradictions? Which 
strategies and institutions did they develop in order to safeguard their internal unity and 
their political and market power? By studying questions like these, we become sensitive 
to the embodied history in existing labor unions, which again helps us to study the chal-
lenges they face at present.
Today, participation through works councils and board-level representatives is 
reserved for union members and federations in Sweden, while in Norway all employ-
ees in the covered companies have the right to elect representatives for these bodies 
(Justis-og beredskapsdepartementet, 1997a, 1997b, 2011; LO, 2013; Svensk Författ-
ningssamling, 2011, 2013). To trace this organizational difference between closely re-
lated labor movements back in time, to contextualize union strategies, and to highlight 
similarities and differences is the main aim of this article. A comparative-historical 
approach is chosen to illuminate how Swedish and Norwegian unions dealt with or-
ganizational challenges connected to worker participation from the period of their 
formation until approximately the 1970s. In addition, possible causal relations will be 
discussed, which might partly explain the discovered difference. The main emphasis 
is on the time periods after the First World War (WWI) and the Second World War 
(WWII) and the 1960s/1970s, because these were periods in which important debates 
and legal changes took place. 
Since then, organizational challenges related to worker participation have not di-
minished, rather the contrary. Despite rising levels of education, promises of individual 
emancipation, good work, democratic rights, and a good life for all are undermined by 
capitalism’s logic of profit, which, despite new management concepts and less authorita-
tive business structures, is still in operation. The current international crisis illustrates 
this well, and it also shows why the question of worker participation has remained up-
to-date (cf. Meine et al., 2011). 
But both old and new forms of worker participation present challenges for the 
unions (cf. Dörre, 2002; Demirovic, 2007; Streeck, 1979). For even if one believes in 
principle in the merit of democratic mechanisms within capitalist enterprises, it is still 
not clear what these mechanisms should look like. Who should be involved in decision-
making and at what level? What effects does it have for unions, when workers come to 
“sit on both sides of the table”? How to make sure that worker participation in single 
businesses does not lead to fiercer competition between groups of wage earners, but 
contributes to broad social solidarity? How to make sure that strong groups would not 
take advantage of their position without taking weaker groups into account, thereby 
threatening the organizations’ unity? These questions are as old as the labor movement 
itself. It is therefore highly valuable to study unions’ approaches to worker participation 
over time. 
The article is structured as follows: First, some central theoretical perspectives on 
worker participation will be presented. Second, the comparative approach and method-
ological base of the article will be explained. Next, the historical evidence on unions’ 
attitudes toward worker participation will be summarized for the three periods under 
consideration. Thereby, union strategies will be traced back in time and put into histori-
cal context, such as capital distribution and structure, the strength of employer organi-
zations, and the politics of the labor parties in both countries. A table will serve to give 
an additional overview over important dates and events. Finally, some careful conclu-
sions will be drawn, which may be of value for future discussions.
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Worker participation as an organizational challenge
As Demirovic (2007, p. 30, translation by the author) points out, worker participation 
should not be reduced to any single institution:
“Worker participation consists of a whole bundle of elements: of the democratic attitude 
among wage earners, their self-organization in unions, the collective agreements and in-
dustrial disputes, of union workplace representatives, works councils and general works 
councils, participation in board-level decision making, participation in public institutions 
such as the social and work administration or public media bodies, [and] of economic and 
statistical expertise and advise.”1
Here, the focus is on the strategies developed by Swedish and Norwegian unions with 
regard to two specific forms of representative worker participation: work councils and 
board-level representation. Works councils can be defined as: 
“Permanent elected bodies of workforce representatives (or occasionally joint committees 
with employer representatives) set up on the basis of law or collective agreements with the 
overall task of promoting cooperation within the enterprise for the benefit of the enter-
prise itself and employees by creating and maintaining good and stable employment condi-
tions, increasing welfare and security of employees and their understanding of enterprise 
operations, finance and competitiveness.” (Carley et al., 2005, p. 7)
The different “councils” and “committees” appearing in the course of history and men-
tioned in this article are all covered by this definition. Despite different names, it is 
argued that they were specifications of the same, albeit changing, kind of institution. 
Nonetheless, there are of course important differences between them, such as differ-
ences in practical importance and coverage (cf. endnotes 10 and 13). It should also be 
noted that it makes a strategic difference for unions whether such bodies are introduced 
through law or agreement. It has been observed that state intervention has been more 
common in Norway than in Sweden (cf. Kjellberg, 1999, p. 61). While this is worth an 
analysis of its own, the focus of this article shall rest on who has been allowed to vote or 
appoint the members, both in cases of works councils set up by agreement and by law. 
Employee board-level representation was first established in the German iron and steel 
industry in 1951 and has since taken many different forms (Gold, 2011, p. 41). It was 
introduced in Norway and Sweden during the 1960s (see Tab. 1). 
When analyzing why works councils and board-level representation constitute or-
ganizational challenges for unions, it is helpful to consider Hyman’s (2001) distinction 
between the three identities of trade unions. Firstly, all trade unions are to some extent 
actors in the class struggle, even if this struggle has been largely institutionalized. Social-
democratic industrial unions in particular are supposed to represent the interests of the 
working class as a whole. This means that their goals cannot be identical with the goals 
of just one of their member groups, for example, the particular interests of the work-
force of a single company. They have to integrate diverging interests against the interest 
of capital (Streeck, 1979). Secondly, trade unions are market actors. Of course, labor is 
a “fictitious commodity”, which cannot be separated from the worker himself (Polanyi, 
1957). More generally, a free labor market is an illusion, because markets are always 
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to some extent embedded in social institutions (Crouch & Streeck, 1997; Hyman, 2001, 
p. 11). Despite, or maybe rather because of this, trade unions aim to monopolize labor in 
order to enhance its market power and value. From this perspective, broad cooperation 
between all wage earners, no matter where they work, is also clearly desirable. Finally, 
trade unions are a part of civil capitalist society and as such have tended to contribute 
to the stability thereof. They have become “social partners” in relation to capital and 
have helped to create a system of industrial relations that serves to temper social ten-
sions. While fighting for, and of course in part achieving, the humanization of capital-
ism, they have contributed to the stability of capitalism itself. The problem of protecting 
the unions’ unity in the class struggle is therefore related to the necessity to discipline 
internal anti-capitalist tendencies (cf. Streeck, 1979). In both cases, control mechanisms 
are necessary to counter internal opposition or particularistic tendencies. Far-reaching 
worker participation in single companies is then not so much regarded as a “step to-
wards a socialist society”, but more as a danger to the stability of the existing balance of 
power, which one has come to terms with (Anker-Ording, 1966). 
Nevertheless, as actors in the class struggle, the industrial unions of Norway and 
Sweden have traditionally advocated worker participation, because many of their 
members have agreed with Marx that work should become an “end in itself” (Marx, 
1972, p. 828; cf. Anker-Ording, 1966). Such work must no longer be alienated, but 
democratically organized, free work, with a positive and humane meaning (cf. Anker-
Ording, 1966, p. 37). As market actors, the Nordic industrial unions also had prag-
matic reasons to advocate forms of union workplace representation: to stay in touch 
with their members and to be able to mobilize them (Streeck, 1979, pp. 724ff). Despite 
this, unions have at times been skeptical of advisory works councils voted by all em-
ployees and of board-level representation (Heiret, 2003a; Kjellberg, 1981). The dan-
ger lies in having to “sit on both sides of the table”, because this can lead to “deals” 
between local workforces and management, or because inexperienced or even non-
unionized workers’ representatives can be “cheated” by management into agreeing to 
policies that increase competition between all wage earners.2 Also, works councils can 
potentially be used against established union clubs and union workplace representa-
tives by employers. This again can threaten class solidarity, internal unity, and thereby 
also the power position on the labor market.3 In this context, local wild strikes, pos-
sibly led by communist or syndicalist union currents, can also represent a danger from 
the point of view of social-democratic industrial unions aiming for consolidation of 
their power position within capitalist society. This means that industrial unions have 
to deal with a “structural dilemma”: They have to find ways to “discipline” their local 
organizational units to follow the collective politics and strategy, while at the same 
time preserving the important functions of these local units (Streeck, 1979, p. 727). 
They have to make the most of any influence they can have on the company level, both 
from a class and from a market perspective, while at the same time preserving and 
protecting their internal unity. How industrial unions tackle this problem is strongly 
related to the system of industrial relations within which they maneuver (Streeck, 
1979, p. 727). 
For all these reasons, unions’ approaches to works councils and board-level repre-
sentation are not self-evident, but subject to contradictory organizational needs. That 
Swedish and Norwegian unions made different choices makes it relevant to study their 
organizational strategies comparatively.
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A comparative design
Methodologically, this study is based on both primary and secondary sources, including 
official publications of unions and social democratic parties, texts of union strategists 
from different periods, and a large number of historical-sociological case studies focus-
ing on the development in either Norway or Sweden, sometimes including short asym-
metrical comparisons. There are also a few explicitly comparative, and therefore highly 
useful, secondary sources (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1985; Kjellberg, 1999; Myrvang, 2001; 
Sejersted, 2011; Stenlås, 2001; Stråth, 2001).
Sweden and Norway make interesting cases, because the two countries have many 
similarities (cf. Sejersted, 2011, p. 9). They are normally classed into the same group in 
large-scale international comparisons, also when it comes to questions of worker partici-
pation (cf. Jackson, 2005). It is true that their trajectories are closely linked, not least due 
to extensive contact between community members. Nevertheless, important differences 
remain. Finding and analyzing these differences can help us understand the particulari-
ties of the social conditions of both countries. This is best done by what Ragin (1987) 
labels the “case-oriented method”, in which complexity has precedence over generality, 
cases are examined as wholes, and causes are assessed in relation to context. One advan-
tage of this kind of comparison is that it provides a rich account of the cases in question, 
which then shed light on each other (cf. Kocka, 2003; Skocpol & Somers, 1980). To 
achieve this aim, historical integrity and context need to be highly valued. Many authors 
have argued that it is desirable even for comparisons of only few cases to also have an 
analytical function, meaning that they can serve to establish generalizable causal links 
(Hantrais, 2009; Kocka, 2003; Skocpol & Somers, 1980). To what extent this is possible 
has been a subject of debate. Ragin (1987) and Welskopp (2010) are of the opinion that 
what Skocpol and Somers (1980) term “contrast of contexts” and “macro-causal analy-
sis” do not necessarily have to contradict each other. The challenge lies in defining which 
factors present in one country, but not in the other, might have affected the historical 
outcome decisively. The present article will make some suggestions as to which factors 
might have been particularly relevant. But in view of the complexity and multicausality 
of the issues at hand, this should not be regarded as a final, but merely a possible partial 
explanation. On any account, comparing both cases should be conducive to a wider per-
spective. With regard to the discovered difference regarding membership requirements 
for participation, this particular comparison also led to the discovery of a new research 
question, which points to another advantage of comparative studies (cf. Hantrais, 2009; 
Kocka, 2003). In the following, the historical trajectories will be outlined, compared and 
analyzed for the three time periods in question.
The debate on works councils and socialization after WWI
As Tab. 1 shows, Norwegian unions embraced the idea of works councils early and con-
nected it to radical visions of socialism. This was associated with ideas about broad coop-
eration within companies. For example, not only radical unionists such as Alfred Madsen 
(1919, 1920) but also less radical figures such as the LO-leader4 Ole O. Lian supported 
the idea of a national council system. Their idea of company councils was that they 
should have power of decision and that blue-collar and white-collar workers, as well as 
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other representatives of society, should cooperate on an equal footing (Den skandinaviske 
arbeiderkongress, 1920, pp. 25, 41, cited in Bjørnson, 2003, pp. 72f). For them, this was 
a prerequisite for the modernization of production. Madsen (1919, p. 15) also thought 
that works councils would strengthen the unions and increase union density, because or-
ganized workers would quickly come to dominate them. This would give non-organized 
workers an incentive to organize. He thought that the existing union clubs were neither 
sufficiently legitimated nor powerful. Madsen (1919, p. 10) was aware of the danger 
of syndicalist tendencies, but assumed that solidarity between workers combined with 
democratic control would be strong enough to abolish destructive competition. While 
Lian supported negotiations with employers over worker participation, Madsen (1920, 
p. 11) argued against this, warning that the original idea could be transformed to serve 
the interests of capital. The employers, on the other hand, were opposed to works coun-
cils, mainly because they feared that national collective agreements could be replaced 
by local agreements, which would increase competition for labor (Bergh, 1983, p. 86; 
Bjørnson, 2003). This indicates that local union strength might have varied considerably. 
When advisory councils, elected by all employees, were established by law in 1920, the 
Norwegian unions considered this to be a small improvement, even though their practical 
importance was limited (Bjørnson, 2003, pp. 70ff). 
In Sweden, the labor party put the idea of works councils on the agenda in 1919. 
Kjellberg (1981, p. 55) points out that the labor party was under pressure from the left 
to position itself more clearly on the question of economic democracy, now that politi-
cal democracy had been achieved.5 The unions, on the other hand, remained skeptical 
of works councils. They did not believe that Swedish employers would agree to works 
councils with decision-making power, thereby giving up their own management rights, 
and they were worried that advisory works councils could be used against their exist-
ing union clubs, which had acquired some relevant influence in some industries. The 
possibility that employers would use works councils to drive wedges between groups 
of workers seemed a real danger. Therefore, the unions had no interest in a “works 
council experiment” (SAP, 1920, cited in Kjellberg, 1981, pp. 54ff; Socialdemokraterna 
& Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, 2001, p. 37). When the economic crisis finally 
contributed to a gradual change of position, because unions had to prove to their mem-
bers that they were not accepting lay-offs without a fight, they demanded that only 
union members should have voting rights for works councils. This was seen as necessary 
in order to prevent competition between union clubs and works councils. The legisla-
tive proposal of 1923 was supported by the LO president, but unpopular among most 
LO unions, in particular the Metalworkers’ union (Kjellberg, 1981, pp. 57ff). But by 
that time, the political climate had shifted and employers and conservative and liberal 
parties were no longer interested in compromise, so the proposal was turned down 
(Lundh, 1987, pp. 494). 
To attempt to understand this different development, one has to consider the 
different capital distribution and structure of both countries and the resulting difference 
of power balances. Industrialization began earlier in Sweden and capital concentration 
was higher. Heavy industry was developed from 1870 onward, while the Norwegian in-
dustrial sector was dominated by light industry for many decades to come. Technology- 
based Swedish businesses were internationally successful at an early date and Swedish 
capitalists could follow in the footsteps of traditional aristocratic authority. In 
Norway, traditional authority was swept aside more thoroughly when independence 
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from Sweden was achieved in 1905, but this also meant that the country lacked 
institutional foundations for industrial development (Sejersted, 2011, pp. 15ff). As 
a consequence, private big business never gained an equally strong foothold as in 
Sweden (Esping-Andersen, 1985, p. 55). Probably in part as a result of this differ-
ence, the organizational density of unions has been higher in Sweden all through the 
20th century (see Tab. 1).6 One could say that class opposition was tougher in Swe-
den (Esping-Andersen, 1985). However, class consciousness seemed to be more pro-
nounced in Norway. The Norwegian labor movement was dominated by the left-wing 
current longer than the Swedish labor movement, which suffered a major defeat after 
the General Strike of 1909, leading to massive membership losses, and which had 
to deal with more powerful employer associations (Bjørgum, 1976; Bjørnson, 2003; 
Kjellberg, 2000; Korpi, 1978, p. 62; Schiller, 1967). In the aftermath of this strike, the 
reformist current gained a majority both within the Swedish LO and the labor party. 
While the Norwegian labor party welcomed the Russian revolution and even joined 
the Comintern for some time, the Swedish labor party distanced itself and entered its 
first coalition-government with the liberal party in 1917 (Sejersted, 2011, pp. 141ff). 
The different role of the liberal parties in both countries is also relevant. Norwegian 
politics were dominated by the liberal party (“Venstre”) from 1884 until about 1940. 
It represented many different social groups, for example, lower white-collar employ-
ees, small business men, master craftsmen, and farmers. In the beginning, it also had 
social-democratic currents and was mainly held together by the desire of independence. 
Later, it became more interested in the regulation of class conflict and a democratic 
peaceful development, which also motivated its support for advisory works councils 
(Bergh, 1983, p. 86; Bjørnson, 2003, pp. 48ff; Bull, 1969, pp. 71f; Sejersted, 2011, p. 52). 
Employers could not always rely on this kind of party. In Sweden, the liberal party was 
not equally powerful and aristocratic-conservative influence on politics remained strong 
much longer (Sejersted, 2011, pp. 61ff). For all these reasons, the Swedish unions seem 
to have been in a more defensive position and possibly could not risk experimenting 
with advisory works councils the same way the Norwegian unions deemed it possible.
The debate on economic democracy after WWII 
After WWII, both Norwegian and Swedish unions pushed for economic democracy and 
for the integration of works councils on the company level into a larger, three-level 
council system (see Tab. 1). Richard Sterner, the leading researcher of the Swedish LO, 
warned in a memorandum in 1943 that worker participation only on the company level 
could lead to particularistic alliances or to “hostage situations” for worker representa-
tives (Ekdahl, 2001, p. 203, cited in Sejersted, 2011, p. 303). This had to be avoided. 
The unions’ post-war programs were inspired by the general hope of creating a social-
ist system, but soon lost their relevance. This was related to the contradictory political 
situation: On the one hand, everyone saw the need to cooperate in order to modernize 
production and create growth. Even the Norwegian conservative and liberal parties 
signed the “common program” (“Fellesprogrammet”), which contained suggestions for 
a three-level council system. On the other hand, ideological resistance from the right 
against the implementation of such a program prevailed. This threatened the reform 
and growth strategies of the labor parties, which had come to power and faced the 
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challenge of building up the economy. Within the labor movement, the unions of both 
countries had been relegated to second place. Consolidating social-democratic political 
leadership now became “an overriding goal” (Korpi, 1978, pp. 230f). Therefore, ideas 
about alternative economic power structures were set aside and compromise was sought 
where conservative resistance could not be overcome (cf. Bjørnhaug et al., 2000, p. 56; 
Sejersted, 2011, p. 305; 1993, pp. 188f). 
In practice, this meant that works councils on the company level were established 
as advisory bodies only. In Norway, industry councils were also established by law, but 
so little supported by employers that they did not play a relevant role. The economic 
cooperation council on the national level became mainly an advisory body for the gov-
ernment and had no connection to the councils on the other levels (Bergh, 1983, p. 91; 
Heiret, 2003a, p. 113). In Sweden, no such bodies were even set up, because the employ-
er organization SAF was fiercely opposed to them (Sejersted, 2011, pp. 304f). According 
to Kjellberg (1981, pp. 65f), the government’s threat of intervention forced employers 
to accept at least some of the union’s conditions, among them the important concession 
that only union members should have voting rights for the advisory works councils set 
up by agreement. This condition was defensive in nature: It was meant to prevent com-
petition between works councils and union clubs. In Norway, all workers received vot-
ing rights for advisory works councils. Non-members and white-collar workers were not 
excluded (Arbeidernes faglige Landsorganisasjon, 1954). As in the period after WWI, 
the Norwegian unions did not consider this a problem for their internal unity. But they 
did see a problem in worker participation on the board-level, when this was discussed 
within the labor party during the 1950s:7 Here, they did not want to come to “sit on 
both sides of the table”. They were worried that union representatives could make fools 
of themselves due to a lack of knowledge, or that they could be used as “hostages” of 
management. The cooperation committee of unions and labor party instead suggested 
that workers should not have representatives on the board, but the board should be 
elected by company assemblies, in which workers should have voting rights (Heiret, 
2003a, pp. 138f; Sejersted, 1993, p. 188). Due to employer opposition and uncertainty 
within LO, nothing came out of this first attempt of the labor party regarding board-
level representation (Bergh, 1983). But the discussion shows that Swedish worries were 
partly shared in Norway, just not to the same extent.
This might be related to the fact that opposition by Swedish employers was fiercer. 
Swedish employers had several advantages compared with Norwegian employers: They 
were better organized, they had had time to prepare strategies during the war, and they 
had more money for propaganda (Stenlås, 2001).8 For all these reasons, they neither 
wanted nor needed the state to regulate industrial relations (Kjellberg, 2000; Korpi, 
1978, pp. 210ff). Norwegian employer associations, on the contrary, repeatedly asked 
for state intervention (Bjørnson, 2003; Dølvik & Stokke, 1998, pp. 129f). This clearly 
supports Sejersted’s hypothesis, that “the Norwegian Sonderweg […] is characterized 
by the weakness of big business and the corresponding strength of the democratic pe-
tite bourgeoisie” (Sejersted, 2011, p. 11). And, it might also explain at least partly why 
Swedish unions were more worried about internal splits. It seems that history repeatedly 
“taught” the Swedish unions that internal unity was crucial if they wanted to retain their 
position as an influential factor in Swedish politics. 
The union strategies may also be interpreted with respect to the unions’ role as 
“social partners” in society (cf. Hyman, 2001). Clearly, unions in both countries were 
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aware of their stabilizing function for the labor governments. They needed to make 
sure that no worker groups would make “irresponsible” wage demands, which could 
threaten government policies. Besides their worry that works councils would be used 
by employers to weaken union influence and create particularistic alliances, Swedish 
unions therefore also tried to minimize internal syndicalist tendencies and to prevent 
local strikes and instability of the system as a whole. Revolution was never really an is-
sue, even though some radical propositions were fronted now and again to please eager 
members. Sweden’s high capital concentration, powerful employers, and well-develop-
ing economy probably all made Swedish unions reluctant to tamper with the power 
balance they had achieved. They faced a stronger opponent than the Norwegian unions. 
And, the legitimacy of the existing system was so strong that seriously challenging it 
seemed unrealistic. Even though the same holds for Norway to a large extent, the Nor-
wegian public was more critical toward employer strategies such as lockouts, and the 
government was more ready to interfere, not always to the employers’ benefit (Bjørnson, 
2003, p. 67; Sejersted, 2011, p. 153; Stenlås, 2001). The legitimacy of non-democratic, 
capital-based power was slightly weaker (Sejersted, 2011; Stråth, 2001). Also, Norwe-
gian unions were possibly more concerned about modernization of production, because 
a modernizing strong capitalist class was missing (Sejersted, 1993, 2011). This could 
explain why Norwegian unions and labor government were slightly more open for new 
experiments deemed too risky by their Swedish counterparts. 
The developments in the 1960s and 1970s
During the 1960s and 1970s, it became evident that unions needed to rethink their 
strategies. Awareness of health and environmental risks was rising and growing interna-
tional competition, restructuring, and closure of companies constituted new challenges. 
Toward the end of the 1960s, the student protests contributed to a change of the politi-
cal climate. Unions and labor parties were accused of acting too defensively and wild 
strikes were becoming more frequent (von Beyme, 1977, p. 125). Against this back-
ground, worker participation again became a major political topic. 
In Norway, a radical proposition was fronted by the “Aspengren-committee”, 
formed by unions and labor party, in 1962: It again suggested establishing company 
assemblies as new company organs, which were to have power of decision and in which 
unionists could act not as representatives of the company but as representatives of the 
workers. All workers should have voting rights (Anker-Ording, 1966). However, the 
mining accident in Svalbard led to a situation in which even the conservative and liberal 
parties advocated board-level representation in state-owned companies. Skepticism of 
employer organizations notwithstanding, especially the conservative party was now of 
the opinion that employees would be at least as capable as the state to make manage-
ment decisions (Bergh, 1983, pp. 103ff). Despite the fact that Norwegian unions were 
still critical of direct representation on the board, the labor party therefore passed a law 
in 1965, which gave employees in state-owned companies the right to suggest repre-
sentatives. The final appointment remained however in the hands of the state and LO’s 
claim for company assemblies was unsuccessful (Bergh, 1983, pp. 104ff). 
Both Swedish and Norwegian union federations renegotiated the agreements on 
works councils in 1966. Management was now supposed to confer with and inform 
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worker representatives on more issues than before. In exchange, they should contri-
bute their knowledge to increase profitability and pacify relations within the company 
(Heilmann, 1991, p. 205; Heiret, 2003a, p. 148; Schiller, 1990, p. 301f). Since then, com-
pany councils (“bedriftssutvalg”) have been part of the Main Agreement between the 
Norwegian LO and the NAF.9 The relevant §12-3 in today’s Main Agreement still reads 
“All employees have the right to vote, except members of management” (LO, 2014).10 
In practice, however, worker representatives on company councils are almost always 
organized (Falkum, 2013, personal communication). It seems that it is not difficult and 
has never been difficult, for the local branches of Norwegian unions to make use of the 
existing participation channels.11 
While giving voting rights to non-members was not considered a danger to internal 
unity, board-level representation still was. LO therefore kept advocating the company 
assembly model to avoid “double loyalties” and to make sure that workers’ representa-
tives could continue to see the representation of workers as their main task (Bergh, 1983, 
p. 114, p. 120; Heiret, 2003a, pp. 147ff). However, employers as well as conservative 
and liberal parties now accepted board-level representation. Experiences in state-owned 
companies and in production councils had shown that cooperation could serve the inter-
est of employers also (Heiret, 2003a, p. 149). Again following the “political logic”, and 
despite LO’s skepticism, the labor party revised the company law12 in 1972, giving all 
employees, including non-members and white-collar workers, the right to elect worker 
representatives for the board in the private sectors of industry and mining. Company 
assemblies were introduced for companies with more than 200 employees (Justis-og 
beredskapsdepartementet, 1976; Stortingstidende, 1971-1972). Similar laws were later 
passed to cover the state-owned companies and other sectors (Bergh, 1983, pp. 117ff). 
Also, the Working Environment Act from 197713, with its rather far-reaching regulations 
on self-determination, workers’ influence on the work and protection from physical 
and psychic burdens, is built on the principle that all employees, regardless of union 
membership, have voting rights. The law is still in place today. Regarding board-level 
representation, the last radical proposal in Norway was made by the Skytøen-committee 
of unions and labor party in 1980, which suggested increasing representation of employ-
ees on the board and in company assemblies to 50% (LO, 1980). While this proposal 
might indicate that LO’s worries regarding board-level representation were now in the 
past, it was not followed up by the government (cf. Heiret, 2003b, pp. 186ff, for a more 
detailed discussion).
In Sweden, the SAF had to consider the interests of the family businesses in its ranks, 
which were massively opposed to workers’ representation on the board. Contrary to the 
NAF, the SAF was not willing to compromise on the subject (Schiller, 1990, pp. 350f). 
Schiller (1990, pp. 305f) points out that the board-level participation debate was seen 
as a minor question by the unions compared with more far-reaching proposals, such as 
the idea of wage earner funds14, and mainly served the strategic purpose of showing the 
public that employers had to be forced by law to give workers any influence. According 
to Heilmann (1991, pp. 206f), the focus on direct worker participation “from below”, 
which Swedish unions now emphasized in their struggle for the Co-Determination in 
the Workplace Act (“Medbestämmendelagen”), diminished traditional worries about 
“double loyalties” with regard to board-level participation. Nevertheless, the tradition 
of giving voting rights to union members only prevailed. The law on workers’ repre-
sentation in management from 1973 gave unions the right to delegate two workers’ 
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representatives and two substitutes to the board of directors (Svensk Författningssa-
mling, 2014c). The modern Swedish Board Representation (Private Sector Employees) 
Act, which replaced the 1973 law, contains detailed provisions for how worker seats in 
management are to be distributed between the different union federations present at a 
workplace (Svensk Författningssamling, 2014a). Also in the Co-Determination in the 
Workplace Act, which has been in place since 1976, all rights apply to organizations, 
not to individual employees, which means that non-members do not receive any influ-
ence (Svensk Författningssamling, 2014b). This law opens—in theory—for far-reaching 
local agreements on worker participation, but in practice, it led to few local agreements 
(cf. Kjellberg, 1981, p. 76; Heilmann, 1991). 
A detailed discussion of the Swedish struggle around the wage earner funds (cf. 
Endnote 14) falls out of the scope of this paper, but one last observation by Sejer-
sted (2011, pp. 376f) is interesting: Again, Sejersted (2011, pp. 376f) points out that 
there was much less concentration of private capital in Norway than in Sweden15, which 
might explain why this idea originated in Sweden and never gained ground in Norway. 
The difference might also have contributed to the Norwegian unions’ argument that 
workers should have influence in their capacity as workers, not as owners (Sejersted, 
2011, p. 376). As we have seen, this line of thought was meant to apply for all workers, 
regardless of union membership.
Conclusion and outlook
Clearly, today’s laws and agreements result at least partly from organizational strategies 
and traditions, which evolved during critical periods of union history. As the comparison 
has shown, Swedish unions across time put more emphasis on the idea that only union 
members should be involved in representative worker participation. They remained 
skeptical of works councils longer and saw union membership as a safety requirement 
to prevent internal splits, also when it came to board-level representation. Nevertheless, 
Norwegian unions were also aware of the dangers of “double loyalties”. But they were 
less worried about “free riders” and rather sure of their own capacity to monopolize 
participation channels. 
Considering the lower union density in Norway, this conclusion might seem surpris-
ing (cf. Tab. 1; Endnote 6). Without a doubt, Swedish unions were well-organized and 
strong. Why Norwegian unions still felt less need for the membership-related precau-
tions Swedish unions took, therefore constitutes a paradox, which needs to be analyzed 
further. However, it is likely that the different strength of the employer organizations 
and the different class structures at least were important factors (cf. Endnote 14). It is 
a possibility that the employers’ capacity of driving wedges between groups of workers 
was greater in Sweden, and that the unions reacted to this, for example, with a more 
restrictive policy regarding the membership requirement for participation. In terms of 
union density, their strategy seems to have paid off, even though union density is of 
course influenced by many factors (cf. Endnote 6).
How the historical trends affect today’s situation cannot be examined in detail here, 
but a few points may be mentioned: The fact that Swedish employers exited centralized 
bargaining and corporative bodies in 1990/1991, while the Norwegian employers still 
take part might indicate that Swedish employers still have more power (cf. Sejersted, 
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2011, pp. 361ff, 378f). For Norway, Løken and Stokke’s (2009, p. 49) evaluation is that 
board-level representation is “generally accepted and viewed positively”—they do not 
mention the contradictions inherent in this institution. This might be related to Gold’s 
(2011) observation that the comparatively close links Nordic worker representatives 
still have with their unions help them to experience their position as less contradictory. 
They are safely anchored in the union network and cannot succumb to company partic-
ularism in the way less well-organized worker representatives possibly could (cf. Hagen, 
2010, for figures on Norway). Nevertheless, this does not resolve the underlying tension 
between the interests of workers and management. In times of economic recession, that 
tension might come to the fore once more. 
For the unions, this means that dealing with particularistic tendencies in a way that 
protects internal unity and solidarity is still an important issue. In particular, the decen-
tralization of wage negotiations, which is to some extent taking place in Sweden, presents 
a challenge for class solidarity (cf. Kjellberg, 2009). On the other hand, decentralized and 
direct worker participation might open up new opportunities for far-reaching changes. In 
Norway, approaches to worker participation vary locally and between sectors (Falkum et 
al., 2009). How Norwegian unions, as well as employers, make use of the existing partici-
pation structures, and how unions have come to dominate them despite the fact that this 
is not legally regulated would be well worth further study (Falkum, 2013, personal com-
munication). Clearly, the study of unions’ strategies regarding worker participation is far 
from finished.
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End notes
1  Demirovic (2007, p. 30) uses the German term “Mitbestimmung”, which could also be 
translated as co-determination. He puts most emphasis on participation through unions, 
but a “democratic attitude among wage earners” can also contribute to direct participation 
in the work process, without necessarily involving unions. “Education, skills and hierarchi-
cal position” are also relevant for direct participation (Hagen & Trygstad, 2009, p. 563). 
The article focuses on the challenges related to representative participation. It should also 
be noted that the term “participation” is used in the EU/EEA context only with relation 
to participation on the board, not in works councils. In this article, both institutions are 
considered forms of participation.
2  Reasons for this might be insufficient knowledge as well as different class habitus, putting 
worker representatives in a position of inferiority. This also contains a danger of overcom-
pensation, for example, when worker representatives try to speak, act and dress just like 
business men, to the extent that they can no longer be distinguished from the opposite 
party (Demirovic, 2007, p. 43).
3  This assertion is not meant to question that current models of worker participation lead 
to a certain level of democratization. Analyses of Gold (2011), Demirovic (2007) and, for 
Norway, Falkum et al. (2009), Hagen (2010) and Heiret (2000), clearly show that worker 
representatives have some relevant influence within their companies. But the underlying con-
tradiction between the workers’ interest in democratization and class cooperation and the 
management’s interest in competition and increased profit remains (cf. Heiret, 2000, p. 304).
4  Both the Norwegian and the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions are called LO (“Landso
rganisasjonen”/“Landsorganisationen”).
5  In Sweden, universal male suffrage was granted in 1909, and women received the right 
to vote in 1918. In Norway, the same happened in 1898 and 1913 respectively. Sejersted 
(2011, p. 11) points this out as a major difference between the two countries: “At the risk 
of oversimplifying, one could say that Norway was democratized before it was industrial-
ized, while the opposite was the case in Sweden. This difference has distinguished the two 
countries’ development trajectories up to the present day, not least in the conspicuous 
strength of democratic norms in Norway.” 
6  There are of course several reasons for this, for example, the fact that unemployment insur-
ance is administered by the unions in Sweden, but not in Norway, and the fact that separate 
white-collar unions have been more successful in Sweden than in Norway (cf. Kjellberg, 
1999, 2009; Nergaard, 2010).
7  Heiret (2003a, p. 138) and Bergh (1983, p. 95) assume that the labor party included 
board-level representation in its 1954-program to prove that they were still a party for 
the working class, despite having moderated its politics in other areas. Bergh (1983, p. 89) 
also points out that board-level representation was included in the first after-war program 
(“Fremtidens Norge”) and supported by some union leaders, but was dropped in the sum-
mer of 1945 due to growing skepticism. 
8  Already in 1942, Swedish employers had founded the propaganda organization Libertas, 
which gave out 17.8 million kronors to conservative newspapers between 1942 and 1950. 
The Norwegian Libertas was not founded until 1947 and created so much public opposi-
tion that it could not achieve very much (Stenlås, 2001).
9 Today: The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO).
10  The Main Agreement states that private companies with more than 100 employees must 
have company councils. Statistically representative figures by Falkum et al. (2009) show 
that about one-third of Norwegian companies with more than 50 employees has com-
pany councils, with another third of employees and managers reporting that they do not 
know whether company councils are established. 
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11  This must be why Hagen and Trygstad (2009, p. 563) claim that “at company level, the 
management’s counterparts are the local branch of the national trade union. Works coun-
cils elected by all the employees […] do not exist in Norway.” They seem to take the domi-
nation of company councils and work environment committees by union members as a 
given, even though this is clearly not based on any legal documents. 
12  Large companies with over 200 employees are required to have company assemblies, of 
which employees can vote a third. In companies with over 50 employees, employees can de-
mand to vote up to a third of the board of directors, and at least one representative and one 
substitute, if the company has more than 30 employees. If it is decided by agreement that a 
company with more than 200 employees shall not have a company assembly, employees can 
vote one additional member of the board (Justis-og beredskapsdepartementet, 1997a,b). 
13  Workers have 50% representation in work environment committees (“arbeidsmiljøutvalg”) 
and their representatives are voted among all employees (Justis- og beredskapsdeparte-
mentet, 2011). Work environment committees can obligate the employer to implement 
work protection measures. In addition, health and safety representatives (“verneombud”) 
chosen by local unions can stop production in cases of danger (Heiret, 2003a, pp. 167ff). 
In a statistically representative survey, two thirds of employees in Norwegian companies 
with more than 50 employees report that work environment committees are established 
(Falkum et al., 2009). For a detailed analysis of the political debate leading to the Working 
Environment Act, see Falkum (2008).
14  The idea of wage earner funds was introduced by the Swedish LO in 1971. The funds were 
meant to slowly transfer a portion of private profits into collective ownership. They were 
introduced in a watered-down version in 1983 and abolished again in 1991 (for a more 
comprehensive discussion, see for example Sejersted, 2011, pp. 372ff and Esping-Adersen, 
1985, pp. 289ff).
15  Quantitative, comparative data on ownership concentration are very hard to come by, as 
Esping-Andersen (1985, p. 54) already pointed out. This lack of data has unfortunately 
not been amended since then (but c.f. Grünfeld et al., 2006). However, there seems to be 
a consensus in the literature that there was, and presumably still is, more and more highly 
concentrated private capital in Sweden and that Swedish big business was also better orga-
nized (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1985; Myrvang, 2001; Sejersted, 2011; Stenlås, 2001; Stråth, 
2001). This would merit further research.
